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Entanglements in Health and Well-being:
Working with Model Organisms in Biomedicine
and Bioscience
Drawing on collaborative ethnographic fieldwork, this article explores how human
health becomes entangled with that of model organisms in day-to-day biomedical
science. Social science scholarship on modeling has explored either how specific
models impact and shape our knowledge of human disease or how animal tech-
nicians and scientists affect laboratory animals. This article extends this relational
approach by asking how embodied and institutional care practices for model or-
ganisms affect the health and well-being of animal technicians and scientists. We
focus on two interspecies bodily experiences: pathogenic exchange and stress. We
then explore enrichment as a strategy for producing health and well-being across
species. We suggest that relations of care form a crucial part of biomedical knowl-
edge production. Not only does care figure in the shaping of model organisms; care
for technicians and scientists also plays a role in bioscientific knowledge production.
We conclude by proposing an interspecies approach to occupational health. [model
organisms, laboratory animals, care, interspecies occupational health]
[A]ll animal experimentation develops entanglements between human and
animal capacities, with potential consequences for both animal and human
well-being—which can never be ignored by science. (Davies 2012a, 633)
Introduction
Laboratory animals used in biomedical science have enabled human and animal
health to be understood as entangled. Specifically, animal models and other model
organisms are central to translational medicine, where nonhuman lives of various
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kinds serve as model systems for understanding biological processes across a range
of species (Ankeny 2007; Ankeny and Leonelli 2011; Friese and Clarke 2012). In
this work, we learn that biomedicine relies on the nonhuman animal who is born,
suffers, and dies for the life and health of human animals (Svendsen and Koch 2013).
Social science scholarship on modeling in medical research has explored either how
specific organisms impact and shape our knowledge of human disease (Ankeny et al.
2014; Davies 2010, 2012b; Nelson 2018) or how animal technicians and scientists
affect laboratory animals (Dam and Svendsen 2017; Druglitrø 2017; Greenhough
and Roe 2011; Kirk 2008, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2016).
This article extends this body of scholarship by exploring how model organisms
affect the health and well-being of animal technicians and scientists. We build on
Elena Buch’s (2013, 639) argument, developed in the context of her ethnographic
research on elderly caregiving, that: “Taking the relational nature of personhood
seriously requires expanding discussions regarding the social relations and processes
that constitute independent persons to include the ways that these processes might
also affect caregivers.” Indeed, as one of us has argued elsewhere, the conditions of
care are as critical for the so-called caregiver as the person who “needs” caregiving
(Latimer 2011, 2018). We transpose this argument from elder care to care for
model organisms, similarly arguing that social science approaches consider how
care practices affect both model organisms and animal technicians and scientists.
Drawing on collaborative ethnographic fieldwork, we explore the specific ways
in which both model organisms as well as scientists and animal technicians are
constituted as (un)healthy in day-to-day laboratory practices. We focus here on the
relationships between animal technicians and mice in the biological services unit
(BSU) or “animal house” of the Institute, as well as the relationships between sci-
entists and worms used as model organisms in a laboratory. Using Svendsen and
Koch’s (2013) delineation of “corporeal exchange” between pigs and scientists, we
thus consider the entanglements between humans and model organisms in research
settings. We focus on two shared and interspecies bodily experiences: pathogenic
exchange and stress. We then explore enrichment as a strategy for producing health
and well-being across species, not only in the animal house (where the term en-
richment is prevalent and readily used) but also in the working lives of technicians
and scientists. We conclude by proposing an interspecies approach to occupational
health that is based on these findings.
Model Organisms and Caring for Laboratory Animals
The most obvious entanglement of human and animal health in biomedical research
is conceptual. Within the biomedical domain, laboratory animals are constituted as
sacrifice-able species that can stand for and represent human bodies and diseases
(Birke et al. 2007, Lynch 1989; Svendsen and Koch 2013). The use of animals
as experimental models in biomedical research is justified by this distinction be-
tween species (Ingold 2000)—nonhuman animals can be modified, experimented
on, and eventually killed in ways that humans can and should not be (Svendsen
and Koch 2013).1 At the same time, modeling also troubles the idea of a clear
species delineation because of a presumed interspecies homology in molecular sub-
stance (genomes) and/or process (such as reproduction, development, and aging)
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that makes modeling relevant (Svendsen and Koch 2013). In this context, the dif-
ferences between humans, experimental animals (e.g., sentient species like mice,
pigs, cats, and dogs) as well as other living experimental organisms assumed to be
insentient (e.g., flies, worms, yeast, bacteria) is generally emphasized, if always also
open to question through comparison (Ankeny 2007).
Much of the sociological, historical, and philosophical scholarship on animal
modeling has focused on the epistemic and organizational aspects of modeling in
biomedicine. Model organisms are usually thought of here as “epistemic objects”
(Rheinberger 2010, 154), around which entire disciplines can be built and different
disciplines can come together (e.g., Kohler 1994; Shostak 2007). A key distinction
made by these scholars is that between models representing biological processes
occuring in another target species (e.g., humans) versus models that stand for a more
basic process occuring across a full range of species (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011;
Bolker 2009). The representational credibility of both types of models is constantly
in question, however, and risks being dismantled if claims based on one species
are over-generalized to another species (Nelson 2013). Species generality through
the evolutionary conservation of biological processes is thus a key assumption in
modeling practices (Logan 2001, 2002, 2005), but one that is always also a site of
concern, question, and debate (Ankeny 2007; Dam and Svendsen 2017).
Sociologists, historians, and cultural geographers have also probed the entangle-
ment of humans and animals in biomedical research by exploring how laboratory
animal (e.g., mice and flies) bodies have been “standardized” to better represent hu-
man bodies, particularly in the context of biomedical “translations” (Clause 1993;
Dam and Svendsen 2017; Kirk 2010, 2008, 2012b; Logan 1999, 2002; Rader 2004).
Selective breeding and transgenics enables animal bodies to be imagined as homo-
geneous in an effort to stabilise knowledge (Davies 2012b, 2013a, 2013c; Rader
2004). Animal bodies are also standardized through routinized animal care that
focuses on uniform practices of housing, food, and handling (Dam and Svendsen
2017; Davies 2010, 2013b; Druglitrø 2017; Kirk 2008, 2010, 2012b, 2014, 2016).
However, Gail Davies (2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c), Nicole
Nelson (2018), and Mie Dam and Mette Svendsen (2017) have all shown that
standardization is often unobtainable, even when genetics are held constant, as the
very different spaces in which humans and laboratory animals live often thwarts
translational efforts.
Across the human–animal entanglement scholarship, care has become a cen-
tral theme (Druglitrø 2017; Friese 2013; Giraud and Hollin 2016; Guerrini 2003;
Holmberg 2011; Kirk 2016; Svendsen et al. 2018). Care for laboratory animals
is generally understood in utilitarian terms within medical science, where concern
with the well-being of animals is crucial for producing high quality science (Friese
2013; Giraud and Hollin 2016; Kirk 2016). How nonhuman animals are cared for
in laboratory science is thought to matter for biomedical knowledge production and
is thus consequential for “representational targets” (e.g., human patients) (Dam and
Svendsen 2017; Davies 2013b).
Adding to this literature, we explore how caregiving affects not only the model
organisms, but also the health and well-being of their caregivers (specifically animal
technicians and scientists) in ways that shape biomedical knowledge. In contem-
porary STS literatures, care is understood as a highly relational, highly productive
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practice that constitutes the worlds within which we live, but also a practice that
is very messy, complicated and uncertain (Haraway 2008; Latimer 2000, 2013;
Latimer and Miele 2013; Puig de la Bellacasa 2011, 2015). STS scholarship has
argued that care is not innocent and cannot be valorized as a way out of unequal
relations; care can just as often also cement hierarchies (Giraud and Hollin 2016;
Martin et al. 2015, Murphy 2015). These arguments intersect with longstanding
feminist explorations of care work across a range of disciplines, which emphasize
the unequal relations that caring practices both rely on and reproduce (Buch 2013;
Colen 1995; Gilligan 1982; Hochschild 2012; Vora 2015).
In her review, Elana Buch (2015, 279) argues that care is thus a shifting and
unstable anthropological concept, one that can refer to everyday practices, engage-
ments with biomedicine, biopolitics, affective states, forms of moral experience and
obligation, structures of exploitation, and the relationships between these various
things. Like Buch, we do not insist on one definition of care, but instead explore
the multiple ways in which care gets enacted and articulated as affective concern
and practical action within our field site (see also Tronto 1994). But where Buch
(2013, 2015) sees care as important for generating social personhood that is dis-
tinctly human, we build on Maria Puig de la Bellacasa’s (2017) work to explore care
as generating more than human socialities, where “neglected things” like mice and
particularly those animals assumed to be insentient, such as worms, are involved in
constituting not only the human person but also scientific knowledge and organi-
zation. We stress how care can appear as “a selective mode of attention,” one that
“circumscribes and cherishes some things, lives, or phenomena as its objects” as it
excludes others (Martin et al. 2015, 627). We therefore explore care as an emer-
gent property of complex interactions, and do not overdetermine when or how care
represents ethical doings (Latimer and Bellacasa 2013). This interpretation of care
means that such work variously focuses on the health of the human or nonhuman
animal, the model as metonymic for the experiment, or even the individual’s, the
laboratory’s and/or the institution’s ambitions and reputation.
Materials and Methods
This article draws on ethnographic fieldwork from 2015 to 2017 at a life sciences
research institute in the United Kingdom, conducted by both Friese and Latimer.
We attended several meetings at the Institute, through which we introduced our
research and discussed how we would undertake a study of how the Institute mod-
eled aging and cared for the animals used in their research. Over the next year and
half, we shadowed animal technicians, laboratory heads, postdoctoral and post-
graduate research scientists, and a veterinarian. As well as positioning ourselves at
the benchside in the laboratories, Friese immersed herself in the Institute’s biolog-
ical services facility (BSU), or “animal house,” where mice were bred, modified,
and euthanized in preparation for their use at the bench. Friese then “followed”
these mice into various laboratories. Latimer also conducted semi-structured, tape-
recorded, qualitative interviews at the scientists’ offices at the Institute after periods
of participant observation in the laboratories. These scientists, observed and inter-
vewed by Latimer, worked with mice, yeast, worms, and cells derived from human
blood.
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Throughout the research we followed the models to understand how care is prac-
ticed in this specific research site. In the context of our research, mice were unique
organisms; as regulated species their breeding and care was largely provided by
animal technicians and veterinarians in the animal house from which the scientists
were inadvertently excluded. In all but one instance, both authors saw only dead
mouse body parts when shadowing scientists who used the mice in their experi-
ments. Care of living things did not arise as a generative concept in these laboratory
contexts. In contrast, worms, as an unregulated animal species, are sustained as liv-
ing things by scientists in the laboratories because they are instituted as insentient.
We observed how worms are enacted by laboratory processes and practices as not
only instrumental objects but also as living organisms that require care. Care thus
did arise as a generative concept in these laboratories (see also Latimer and Puig
de la Bellacasa 2013). As such, care practices were unevenly distributed and very
much linked to the type of model organism used by the laboratory in their exper-
iments, which was linked to the regulation and corresponding spatial distribution
of different species across the Institute.
Comparing care across species as well as across different kinds of scientific sites,
including foregrounding care of worms grown and used in the laboratory, requires
that we make certain awkward juxtapositions and comparisons (Strathern 1997)
between care of different kinds of living things: human and nonhuman animal
but also human technician, veterinarian and scientist; regulated, sentient, verte-
brate animals like mice versus unregulated, insentient, invertebrate animals like
worms; occupational health and animal welfare; care for others, and care for self.
In comparing and juxtaposing human and nonhuman animals, we are deliberately
troubling the very divisions that underpin and dominate social as well as biological
taxonomies.
Pathogenic Exchange
The risk of pathogenic exchange between animals and humans is high among those
caring for animal models in laboratory research. At the same time, risk can be
mediated through care. Controlling pathogenic exchange is indeed central to the
work of the Institute’s animal house. Not only does the facility exclusively use
ventilated cages and racks that provide filtered air and water to the mice, but it also
has a whole set of procedures in place meant to minimize pathogenic exchanges
between the laboratory animals and their human caregivers. In this section, we will
explore how the institute has responded to high levels of animal allergies among
BSU staff, which is caused by interaction with the mice. We show that controlling
pathogenic exchange is directed at both the human and the animal in modeling
practices, with the aim of facilitating health among interacting species.
Robert Kirk has shown how, since the middle of the 20th century, limiting and
controlling the intercorporeal mixing of animals in laboratories has been central
to standardizing animals as model organisms. This has been done through the
creation of germ-free animals as well as the conversion of isolation technologies
into laboratory animal cages (Kirk 2012a, 2012b). Isolating laboratory animals
from specific pathogens has also been crucial in maintaining genetically modified
animals, several of which are immunocompromised (Davies 2012b). Controlling
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pathogenic exchange has thus been understood as a key way of acting on laboratory
animals, transforming them into standardized models for biomedical research.
Kirk (2016) as well as Giraud and Hollin (2016) have shown that healthy an-
imals and quality care have been equated in laboratory animal welfare since the
mid-20th century. This was seen at the Institute, which attributed the health of its
animals to its biosecurity measures, which they and other scientists understood as
high quality care. Indeed, it was recommended that we conduct participant obser-
vation at this site in part because the longevity of the mice at this facility was far
greater than many would expect, and the Institute was thus deemed exemplary in
providing animal care.
Friese has to learn this form of care to enter the mouse house, which involves
passing correctly through the space of the locker room as well as the air shower.
Escorted by Evelyn, an animal technician, Friese is told that she can enter the BSU
through the air shower with an employee, but that on leaving she will have to
leave through the air shower on her own. Evelyn presses the button for the shower
to begin, and air was blown on the two of us from multiple directions for about
60 seconds. As they enter the experimental unit of the BSU, Friese asked why they
can enter the BSU through the air shower together, but have to leave the unit
through the air shower alone. Evelyn responds that they want to make sure any
animal pathogens do not get out with us. Where Friese presumed the biosecurity
measures were for the health of the mice, she learns that air showers were also there
for the health of the humans.
We generally think that isolating laboratory animals is for the purpose of animal
health and standardization. By being more healthy, these animals will be better
models—capable of improving the health of human patients downstream. But the
air shower shows how controlling pathogenic exchange is also for the purpose
of creating healthy caretakers. Indeed, before undertaking fieldwork in the animal
house, Friese has to have a number of tests taken at occupational health and safety:
blood tests, a lung test, and an hour-long mask fitting test along with training on
how to properly fit a mask. She is told that occupational health has been slow
to address the working conditions of animal technicians and that this has posed
problems for the Institute; a rising number of people in the BSU have developed
severe animal allergies. Bruce, the head of occupational health, tells Friese that
some of the most senior BSU staff can barely enter the animal house anymore, as
they have developed such severe animal allergies. Both the laboratory animal and the
animal technician need to be cared for by the institution in this context, by carefully
modulating interspecies relationships for the purpose of interspecies health. This is
required for both species (animal technician and animal model) to care for another
(animal model and downstream human patient).
The effort to control pathogenic exchange between humans and animals, for
the health of both species, has the unintended consequence of keeping many of
the scientists out of the BSU at the Institute. The shower was a continual point of
reference in our discussions with scientists, who frequently told us both formally in
the interviews conducted by Latimer and informally during participant observations
that they would like to see their mice a lot more. However, as one scientist put it,
they simply do not have time to “take all those showers.”
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The problems of physical contact in the context of biosecurity has tended to
focus on the ways that infant–maternal attachments—particularly in laboratory
primates—are interrupted through attachment theory (Kirk 2012a), and hence on
the consequences of limited relationships within species for the psychological well-
being of laboratory animals. We find that delimited physical contact across species
also shapes day-to-day experiences in producing bioscientific knowledge, isolating
scientists from the animals that their research is based upon. The scientists are thus
unable to engage in the kind of caring relations with their mice that at least some
would like. This could be seen as a site of unintended dis-entanglement.
Stress
Stress is another issue where the health of human scientists, animal technicians,
and laboratory animals is entangled. Kirk (2014) has shown how the idea of stress
transformed the ethics and eventual regulation of laboratory animal use in British
science, expanding the scope of how an animal may suffer beyond physical pain—
including social and mental distress. Building on ethological knowledge, stress in
these studies included not only how the animals related to one another in the cage
but also how the animals related to the scientists and animal technicians working
with them. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the focus shifted from not only mitigating
animal pain to also promoting animal well-being (Kirk 2014, 251). Kirk focuses on
how the human is imbricated in the production of animal well-being in this context:
Stress made the physical and social environment determining factors of the
physiological state of the laboratory animal under study. Furthermore, stress
relocated the human subject within that environment, making the researcher
integral to, controller of, and obligated to, the laboratory animals’
well-being. (Kirk, 258, see also Nelson 2018, 115–16 especially)
We want to emphasize here that model organisms also create stressors for animal
technicians and scientists in ways that shape the latters’ health and well-being.
Stress in the BSU
Friese is spending the day with an animal technician, Janet, who has done this type
of work for about 35 years. Janet starts by giving some background to her work for
the day. The Balb C mice that she looks after in the animal house are destined for
use in one of the laboratories in the Institute, which focuses on questions of aging
and immunity. Janet explains that the problem with Balb C mice is that males of
this strain cannot be aged because they fight too much, even with litter mates, so
aged male Balb C mice would have to be housed alone. Housing mice for up to
three years alone in a cage was not something that the Institute considered ethical,
the implication being that mice need community or they will become excessively
stressed. So the lab, in conjunction with the BSU, decided to try to age female Balb
C mice, who are considered quite docile, very unlikely to fight, and thus can be
housed together. This was the first time that females of this strain had been aged by
the animal house, and Janet says that it has been a big learning process for them.
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For example, once they started aging Balb C mice, the technicians began finding
bloody discharge in the bedding. The technicians became very concerned and called
the veterinarians in. By performing autopsies on these mice after they died, the
veterinarians realized that they had developed ovarian and liver cancers in their
old age. Since the veterinarians did not believe that the mice were experiencing any
pain or suffering from the tumours, the research could continue. Nevertheless, the
technicians began to check the cages every day to ensure the health of the mice. Balb
C mice are fragile, however, and this level of surveillance proved to be excessive:
too stressful for the animals. Modifying their technique of care, the technicians now
check the cages one time per week.
Janet starts these weekly checks by organizing the cages according to age, starting
with the oldest ones first. All of the cages with older mice are marked with a red tag
stating, “ageing illness, bloody discharge.” Janet puts eight cages on the trolley, and
brings the mice close to the hood. She turns off the light on the hood so as not to
disturb the quite anxious Balb C. Janet further explains this precaution, saying, “be-
cause they’re albino, it just feels like they should not have light directly on them.” She
puts one cage under the hood, and looks at the mice in the cage, watching their gait
and how they are moving. One at a time, she scruffs each mouse to look at her under-
side, palpates her stomach to check for any hardness, and then looks at her teeth.
Janet watches the mouse move around the cage, and holds the mouse in her hand
to see how she comes off to assess strength. If Janet notices anything wrong with a
mouse, she takes note and contacts her line manager to decide on the required next
steps. In one instance, Friese sees Janet and her line manager decide to call on one
of the two full-time veterinarians, who will determine whether or not a mouse is
suffering to the point where it should be killed in accord with U.K. regulations.
Janet is affected by the mice’s predicament. Friese asks Janet what happens if the
technicians and veterinarian feel an aged Balb C mouse simply will not make it to
be two years old, and thereby will not able to be used in the aging research. Janet
replies that there is one mouse that she thinks will die before two years, and she
adds that there are times when the lab is told by the BSU that they will just have
to do something different because the mice will not live to two years. The lab will
try to do whatever it can with the tissue from those mice. Janet continues that it
is hard to see a mouse who is starting to die, and who won’t quite make it to an
experiment. “To have lived in these cages for two or more years, which must be
boring for the mice, and then to not quite make it to the study, it is really sad.”
Stress is being enacted in multiple ways within these interspecies relations. The
physical body of the mouse is stressed by age and the emotional body of the mouse
is stressed by the boredom of living, for a very long time, in a small cage. Both these
stressors affected Janet, which, in turn, creates an everday form of work-place stress.
For Friese, this stress appears palpable, as Janet talks throughout the day about the
research she is doing, in her own time, to provide more interesting and stimulating
treats for “her mice” to help alleviate their boredom. Like Claire Stacey’s (2011) and
Elena Buch’s (2013) findings with human care givers, we find that animal technicians
“contribute to their own exploitation” by taking on additional and unpaid work to
attend to their affective ties with their mice.
While much of animal technicians’ care work is physical labor—it is physically
hard to be on one’s feet, to bend up and down repeatedly to get and lift cages,
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to fit one’s body within the hood all day—animal technicians’ work also entails
emotional labor. It is emotionally hard to work with stressed animals—mice whose
strain is prone to be anxious, who are in a small cage for as long as a mouse can
be made to live, and who have cancers as a result. And this creates stress for the
animal technicians. The animal technician is the “controller” (Kirk 2014) of the
laboratory animal’s well-being, but this is a form of entanglement that also causes
emotional, physical, and psychic stress for the caregivers. Stress and well-being are
here relationally produced across species.
Stress at the Bench
Doing bench science is perceived by many scientists as stressful. In all the inter-
views conducted by Latimer—with scientists at different moments in their scientific
careers—the stressful demands of being a scientist were articulated as something
that needed to be managed. Stressors were rather expectedly connected to funding
and publishing cycles and the problem of failure, particularly failed experiments.
But what emerged in our data, and what we focus on here, is how the life and
disease cycles of model organisms and the demands of an experiment make specific
kinds of demands on scientists.
Jake is a Ph.D. student and is in the process of becoming a scientist. When
shadowing Jake, he appeared incredibly confident and adept. On one occasion,
Latimer was observing him work with gravid worms, with the aim of making a
cohort of aged worms from his RNA libraries. The worms come from a particular
strain bred to be sterile at 25 degrees centigrade. Jake gets a plate of worms from
the incubator, which keeps the worms at a steady temperature, and takes them to
the bench beside his microscope. He notes that he is pleased because the worms
have reproduced well in the incubaror and on the food he has given them; his care
of the worms has worked.
Jake tells Latimer that he is going to dissolve the worms in sodium hypochlorite,
or bleach, leaving just their eggs. He continues to explain that this is not very nice,
bleaching worms to death, but he needs a population of eggs that, when they hatch,
will be in a different temperature than normal—a temperature of 25° Celsius—so
that they become sterile. Jake will do this for different batches of worms at different
moments in their life cycle. This will allow him to observe differences in gene ex-
pression that are not attributable to the young tissue/embryonic tissue contained in
the eggs. He says that it is simple to do this in the worm. All tissue is somatic except
for the germline tissue (the tissue in the eggs); somatic tissue does not divide, so one
set of cells lasts the worm’s lifetime. Thus, the demands of Jake’s experiment fit the
specificites of the worm’s biology (life cycle, reproductive characteristics), which
requires an exacting control of the environment (supplies of food, temperature,
etc). That is, it requires matters of care for both the worms and the experiment
that are so sedimented and normalized that these care practices have become
invisible.
Later, during the recorded interview, Jake sums up what he calls the “doing of
science.” Importantly, this interview took place after Jake had discovered that the
experiment, partially described above, had failed. This meant that half of his work
for his Ph.D. had failed. Jake was very, very low; his body language and tone were
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deflated. At this moment, he describes in the interview the doing of science as “being
married to your model.”
Jake: If I’d been told what it takes to do science. Not to be a scientist, but to
do the science. . . . Like the time and the frustation, and the . . . especially
working with biology. I think I would have considered it a lot more heavily.
I may have made the same decision, but . . . I don’t think I ever. . . . That
was never really impressed upon me as a student, was the doing of the
science. Because in school all you do is learn, it’s book work, and it’s what I
loved! [Laughs].
[Latimer]: Yeah, so you mean the kind of, the real practical . . .
Jake: Yeah.
[Latimer]: Working the materials, working between all these different kinds
of, I mean it is extraordinary, you know, in a day, following one of you.
Jake: Mmm.
[Latimer]: How you’re working with so many different techniques. Different
machines, different procedures.
Jake: Yeah, well not just that, I think the life of a scientist, and like
probably, even just the fact you will be married to your model.
[Latimer]: Yeah, married to your model!
Jake: It’s not something you understand until you do it. But it dictates your
whole life. I don’t like that.
[Latimer]: This is the Scientific Life?
Jake: Yes. For people to understand, like it’s, this is, it’s kind of, doing
science is really, sometimes really tough and frustrating, and not nice. . . .
And I don’t know, I don’t know if that means. . . . Everyone feels differently
about it, and many people have no problem, or at least if they, it’s not
enough of a problem to sort of not do it. . . . But when you work with
models or you’re doing experiments that means you have to come in at the
weekend, and almost every weekend, and that sort of just means like it’s no
longer, you know, you’re not in control of your lifestyle anymore, of your
life, like. And if you don’t do the experiments, or you delay them, then they
don’t get done . . . .The time, the time thing, where there’s never enough time,
and I don’t know if this comes from the funding or just being a student, but
yeah, there’s always an expectation of, that you’ll work more and produce
more. That’s sometimes quite hard to manage.
We note Jake’s metaphor: For him, the image of marriage is the one he reaches
for to express the extent to which biology and experimental work entangles him
and curbs his freedom. Doing science for Jake at this moment is all about not having
control over his own life, about being at the beck and call of the experiment and more
specifically the biology of his model organism, the worm. At this moment, Jake’s
experience is not that of a sovereign subject, with a disembodied, transcendent,
conquering gaze from nowhere (Haraway 1991). Rather, for Jake, in the context
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of a failed experiment, the doing of science that is normally made invisible in
publications comes to the foreground, as matters of care that “organizes, classifies,
and disciplines bodies” (Martin et al. 2015, 627). These bodies include not only the
animal’s, but Jake’s as well.
While Janet is affected by the boredom of the aged mice in the BSU as an
animal technician, Jake is affected by the deterministic role that worms play in his
life as a scientist. Stress is both a trope and an experience that partially connects
worms, mice, scientists, and animal technicians. The relations that these different
species have to one another—scientists with worms, animal technicians with mice—
within the confines of the experiment produces embodied states that are defined as
“stressful.”
Enrichment
Enrichment activities are one of of the primary ways in which stress is alleviated
among laboratory animals, who are thought to be particularly susceptible to bore-
dom (Wolfer et al. 2004). For example, Lesley Sharp (Forthcoming) notes that
televisions are used with nearly all captive primates today to prevent distress and
psychological illness caused by boredom in the captive setting. Improving the well-
being of laboratory animals is heavily focused on, ameliorating the boredom of cap-
tivity, which is understood as stressful—as exemplified in Janet’s example, above.
This is why enrichment is a crucial part of laboratory animal welfare and science
today. At the Institute, social housing (i.e., not allowing male Balb C mice to live
alone for an extended lifetime as described above), cage design, and the inclusion
of seeds in cages (that must be searched for and opened, giving the mice some-
thing to do) were all examples of how the Institute tries to enrich the lives of its
mice.
Enrichment went beyond the mice, however, often targeting animal technicians
and scientists as well. The Institute is a campus, with buildings and a residential vil-
lage arranged in what was the parkland (where sheep graze) of a former aristocratic,
mansion house. The lives, health, and well-being of scientists is enacted over and
over again as constitutive of the Institute’s identity; indeed, the focus on promoting
scientists’ well-being at the Institute is part of its explicit recruitment strategy, as
seen on its webpage. For example, benches and tables are arranged outside in the
extensive and well-maintained gardens that adjoin the parkland, which employees
use to sit and think, or work, eat, and socialize. The building in which we did our
observations in the laboratories was designed to promote openness, community,
and interaction—with offices situated on the other side of the corridors from the
labs—either open plan, or with glass doors to promote visibility and easy interaction
between all levels of staff. There was a gym, a new running/cycling track, a village
with different forms of accommodation to cater to all (from visiting researchers
through to married couples with children), an on-site nursery, a new open plan and
modern restaurant purveying healthy options, and sofas and comfortable seating
areas for people to meet.
Similarly, the BSU was created to not only provide good care for the animals, but
also good care for the animal technicians. Because of the showers, animal technicians
could not as easily get out to enjoy the campus life of the Institute. So the facility
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was built to bring the outside parkland into the BSU as much as possible. This
facility was not built below ground, as many animal houses are, but above ground
with windows to the outside. There is a nice view to the surrounding parkland at
the end of each corridor, as well as from the kitchen where staff take breaks, with
tea, coffee, and a television provided. The bucolic image of sheep grazing can thus
be enjoyed during a break. Artificial plants, which required special permission from
the Home Office that licenses animal houses and all scientists working with animals,
are present and meant to make a more pleasant work space for technicians.
The scientists’ and the animal technicians’ working lives were thus enriched, as
much as the working lives of the mice were. And for both species, these enrichment
activities were for the purpose of enhancing health and well-being including ame-
liorating stress. Ameliorating stress, in turn, improves productivity across species.
The laboratory animal serves as a better model organism if it is well, in that the
biological consequences of stress do not create confounding variables in the research
(see also Friese 2013). The animals will be better cared for if there is not a high
turnover of animal technicians; keeping animal technicians happy at their job im-
proves the well-being of the mice. The scientists are similarly more productive if
they are less stressed; the kind of stress described by Jake is simply not sustainable
across a career.
For the scientists in particular, this included cultivating a “care of self” that was
facilitated by the Institute. Latimer is spending the day with Helena, a postdoc. She
starts her day by sitting at her desk, taking time to clearly and quietly think through
her day. She tells Latimer that there are four things that they need to do, plus two
seminars to attend. Latimer responds that Helena really packs it in. Helena says that
she likes to get a lot done, to feel good and that otherwise she will feel frustrated.
Throughout their time together Helena touches her belly, a gesture common to
pregnant women. She talks about the things she is doing, and what the Institute
is helping her to do, to ensure her baby’s environment is secure and to promote
its health, well-being, and optimal growth. Helena tells Latimer that she trained
as a yoga teacher when she was pregnant last time, and now takes yoga classes at
the Institute. In addition, she tells Latimer about a mindfulness course put on by
the Institute. A little message pops up on her computer screen—from Tiny Pause—
reminding her to take a tiny pause throughout her work day. She tells Latimer that
Tiny Pause put on a course at the Institute, which included instructions to take time
for a pause that enables deep thought. Helena says that they advised the scientists
to turn off their mobile phones and not look at their emails except at specified times
during the day; they should switch off notifications, except from the Tiny Pause
Program itself, which periodically notifies them to take a deep breath, or a tiny pause.
Both Yoga and the mindfulness course—the first initiated by Helena and adopted
by the Institute, and the second put on by the Institute and adopted by Helena—are
disciplinary forms that promote a care of self that aims to ameliorate stress. Helena
says they help her “think well and keep calm and healthy.” As they go through the
day, Latimer sees Helena serene yet active, shifting between different forms of care
made possible by the ethos of the Institute: washing her hands, putting on two sets
of gloves, taking things slowly and methodically when she needs to think, speeding
up when she is working in the lab, participating in the openness of community.
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Helena continuously shifts between and seems to embody community, care of self,
care of others, and, of course, care of her experiments.
Discussion
In this article, we have explored how the health and well-being of different species
are entangled in the laboratory, when model organisms are used to know and
improve human health. The social science literature on laboratory animals is in-
creasingly using the trope of entanglement to understand human–animal relations
in this biomedical context. Gail Davies (2012a) uses entanglement to produce and
render speak-able a conjecture in which mice not only model for human patients, but
where human patients could also model for laboratory mice (see also Greenhough
and Roe 2011). Mette Svendsen and Lene Koch (2013) use the trope of entangle-
ment to describe the unrestricted and dynamic relationships between humans and
animals in the laboratory that remain barely noticed, which they contrast with the
“calculative exchange” of the animal model paradigm. Entanglement has thus al-
lowed social scientists to understand human–animal relationships in the laboratory
as dynamic and constitutive, and thus trouble the delineation of species difference.
In the process, both Davies (2012a) and Svendsen and Koch (2013) highlight the
role of affect in the entanglements of human and animal health.
Drawing on Davies (2012a) and Svendsen and Koch (2013), we have understood
entanglement as a process that links humans and nonhumans in material ways and
that has affective dimensions. The need to carefully control pathogenic exchanges
between humans and mice shows the material entanglements of laboratory animals
and their caregivers. But both model organisms and humans nonetheless continue
to affect the health and well-being of one another: A young scientist expresses
the stress of “being married to the model”; the technician tells how affected she
is by the stress and sickness of the mice she looks after; Balb C mice become
stressed when handled too frequently; aged mice get cancer; worms are bleached to
death.
In the process, we expanded on what counts as health and well-being when non-
human species serve as models in biomedicine. Health has almost exclusively been
considered in terms of the animal (as model) and the human patient (as target), with
the health of unregulated species like flies and worms being deemed inconsequential.
This article has sought to show how animal technicians and scientists alike are af-
fected by their entanglement with other species, and how the health and well-being
consequences of these interspecies relations is experienced by individuals as well as
managed by the Institute. In this context, enrichment is not something that humans
simply do to laboratory animals to improve and control the health and well-being
of their models. Rather, technicians and scientists are also affected by their mod-
els and—as in the case of Jake—sometimes feel that their lives are actually being
controlled by the model organism. The technician’s and scientist’s environment also
needs to be enriched in this context, to make the stress of doing science with other
species manageable.
This adds another way in which we can understand care as a crucial part of
medical knowledge production. Not only does care constitute knowledge by shaping
the body of the model organism (Davies 2012a; Friese 2013). Care for technicians
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and scientists is also constitutive of how scientific knowledge can be produced.
Showers delimit the proximity of the relationship between mice and scientists at
the Institute, delimiting the possibility for caring relations between scientists and
their mice. Care for self through yoga and mindfulness becomes part of scientific
practice. Care entangles humans and other model organsisms in the animal house
and in the laboratories, as a world-making activity (Puig de la Bellacasa 2011),
which constitutes the health and well-being of all species involved, and in ways that
exceed the model organism paradigm. We thereby extend Elena Buch’s argument
that care affects the caregiver from the elder care setting to the laboratory animal
care setting, and thus argue that caregiving not only makes persons but also makes
knowledge.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, we would like to suggest the productivity of developing a
more than human approach to occupational health. In making this argument, we
build on and extend the ways in which Beth Greenhough and Emma Roe (2011)
have proposed a “cross-species research ethics.” Greenhough and Roe here put the
ethics of laboratory animal and human subject research side by side, in an awkard
comparison, to note that the ethics of human research subjects tends to focus on
consent and language, where the ethics of laboratory animal research tends to focus
on affective relations. Greenhough and Roe argue that, rather ironically, it could
benefit human research subjects to incorporate the focus on affective relations that
is seen with sentient laboratory animals.
A cross-species occupational health approach would similarly put the model or-
ganisms working in experiments side by side with the technicians and scientists
who are working the experiments. Occupational health tends to focus on delimiting
the conditions through which human workers could become ill in the workplace,
which is understood as a political economic issue (Murphy 2006). This is done
by protecting bodies (e.g., through the air shower to prevent pathogenic exchange)
from illness-causing agents. Animal welfare similarly delimits the conditions through
which laboratory animals become ill, but the absence of illness is not deemed suf-
ficient. Laboratory animals are expected to be “happy” (Poole 1997), or at least
happy enough. Rather ironically, it could benefit human workers to incorporate
the focus on enriched working environments that is seen with sentient laboratory
animals.
Avoiding illness and promoting health may indeed need to become part of oc-
cupational health as burnout is increasingly becoming a key occupational health
hazzard in the context of neoliberalism. Interestingly, to date burnout has largerly
been addressed through the empowerment paradigm (e.g., yoga and mindfulness)
that focuses on individual-level changes and thus depoliticizes work-related stress
(Funahashi 2013, 2). Daena Aki Funahashi notes that it is the individual who is
deemed in need of reworking in this context, as opposed to the neoliberal struc-
turing of work and precarity. Rather ironically, a cross-species occupational health
could benefit human workers again by incorporating a more relational understand-
ing of stress. This could emphasize the spatial and structural underpinnings of
work-related stress, and its potential amelioration, for humans and animals alike.
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1. There is a history of medical science experimenting on humans in ways that
have relied on and reproduced structures of inequality based on race, class, sex,
and nation (Briggs 2002; Washington 2006). This is often through the equation of
‘othered’ human groups with animals (Ritvo 1987; Rothfels 2008).
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